From: AL-KERNEL <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Subject: [CVE-2026-89444][MODERATE 7.0] platform/x86: dell-wmi-sysman: Don't hex dump attribute security buffer
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 20:58:37 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)
CVE: CVE-2026-89444
Priority: MODERATE 7.0
AL-KERNEL base severity: MODERATE
KPANIC flag: YES
Patch: platform/x86: dell-wmi-sysman: Don't hex dump attribute security buffer
Commit: ceeee18c927958b74a04b92cf084fc496fa21e8b
Upstream patch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=ceeee18c927958b74a04b92cf084fc496fa21e8b
Original CVE announcement: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-89444
Analysis date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 20:58:37 -0400
ActionableScore: 5
ActionableScore lower bound: 4
Actionable bucket: Actionable Moderate / Strong Important candidate requiring manual review
Manual review required: YES
Summary:
No one-sentence report phrase was found.
======================================================================
ABOUT THIS REPORT
======================================================================
The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-89444 is available here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-89444
The original announcement does not normally provide a security severity
estimate, CVSS assessment, or enough information to determine whether the
reported kernel bug represents a practically relevant security issue.
This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel
vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin. It combines
an autonomous classifier with LLM-assisted technical analysis and a
separate ActionableScore mechanism.
The purpose of this report is to prioritize Linux kernel CVEs before
manual review, identify cases that require prompt investigation, and
support automatic closure of issues that are unlikely to have meaningful
security impact.
Published priority for this report: MODERATE 7.0
Manual review required: YES
A detailed explanation of the methodology and priority rules is included
at the end of this message.
======================================================================
AL-KERNEL CLASSIFICATION RESULT
======================================================================
CVE-2026-89444 MODERATE https://www.kernelcve.org/list/?q=CVE-2026-89444 CHECK WITH IMPACT FROM ORIG NN LOW Maybe valid. Check manually. Hints by AL-KERNEL: The best (paranoid) CVSS is 'AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N';CWE-532;*CWE-200;CWE-312;CWE-532;Other CVSS 'AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N';BEST CVSS score: '6.1';DESCR 'A sensitive information disclosure exists in dell-wmi-sysman because set_attribute can place the current BIOS admin password into the BIOS attribute request buffer and then dump that buffer to the kernel log. A local attacker with access to kernel logs can recover the plaintext BIOS admin password after an administrator or management process changes a BIOS attribute. For the CVSS the PR:L value is used because practical exploitation requires a local user or service context that can read dmesg or journal logs, but not necessarily full root privileges. The issue is not network reachable and is not a memory corruption bug. Impact is primarily high confidentiality loss, with possible limited integrity risk if the exposed BIOS password is later used to change firmware settings.';YES REQUIRES MANUAL CHECK; ,and ActionableScore result is Actionable Moderate / Strong Important candidate requiring manual review (with actual score 5) YES KPANIC INCREASED_FROM_LOW_BASED_ON_REQUIREMANUALCHECK NO NO checked
======================================================================
ACTIONABLESCORE ANALYSIS
======================================================================
ActionableScore=5
ActionableScoreLower=4
PrimitiveClass=CLASS_A
RealUAF=NO
HostAdminRequired=NO
NamespaceScopedPrivilege=NO
ImportantCandidate=YES
ManualReview=REQUIRED
AutoDowngradeAllowed=NO
1. ActionableScore
* Raw conservative score: 4
* Conservative score: 4. No floor or cap applied.
* Raw paranoid score: 5
* Paranoid score: 5. No floor or cap applied.
* Final recommended bucket: **Actionable Moderate / Strong Important candidate requiring manual review**::
2. Signal breakdown
Conservative positive signals:
* +2 Sensitive credential disclosure: the BIOS admin password is placed into the request buffer and then dumped to the kernel log.
* +1 Confidentiality plausible: a local actor with access to kernel logs can recover the plaintext BIOS admin password.
* +1 Practical exploit chain: populate_security_buffer() writes the password into the buffer, print_hex_dump_bytes() logs the buffer, and log access exposes the secret.
Paranoid additional signal:
* +1 Integrity plausible: the leaked BIOS admin password may later allow unauthorized firmware or BIOS configuration changes in environments where the attacker can reach the Dell WMI sysman interface or reuse the credential operationally.
Non-awarded signals:
* RealUAF not awarded. No stale pointer or post-lifetime object use is shown.
* Memory corruption not awarded. The issue is logging of sensitive data, not overwrite, UAF, OOB, or type confusion.
* Remote reachability not awarded. The leak is local through kernel logs.
* Local unprivileged trigger not awarded. The vulnerable log emission may require an administrator or management process to set a BIOS attribute.
* Direct LPE not awarded. The patch supports credential disclosure and possible downstream integrity impact, not a demonstrated privilege escalation chain.
* Extra availability not awarded. No crash, panic, stall, or resource exhaustion is involved.
3. Reachability analysis
The practical attacker is a local user or service that can read kernel logs, such as dmesg or journal output, depending on system log permissions. This is below host-admin in some deployments, so HostAdminRequired=NO is used, but exploitation is still dependent on log access policy.
The actual log emission occurs when set_attribute() is used and the BIOS attribute request buffer contains the current admin password. Creating a fresh leak may require an administrator or a privileged management tool to change a BIOS attribute. However, once the password has been written to the kernel log, a log-readable local attacker can obtain it.
No namespace-scoped capability is involved. No network path is established. The issue is Dell platform specific, but no rare hardware penalty is applied because the vulnerable path is tied to a supported Dell WMI sysman driver feature rather than an exotic execution mode.
4. Primitive and severity interpretation
The exact primitive is plaintext credential disclosure through kernel logging. The affected secret is the BIOS admin password, which is security-sensitive because it can protect firmware configuration changes.
PrimitiveClass=CLASS_A is used because a concrete credential disclosure is directly established. This is not a corruption or lifetime primitive, but it is an Important-preserving security primitive for triage because it exposes a privileged credential.
The demonstrated consequence is high confidentiality impact. The speculative but defensible paranoid consequence is limited integrity impact if the recovered BIOS password is usable for later firmware setting changes. There is no demonstrated arbitrary write, kernel memory corruption, UAF, or direct root escalation.
ImportantCandidate=YES because plaintext credential exposure should not be automatically downgraded as an ordinary low-risk logging issue. AutoDowngradeAllowed=NO because automatic closure would risk missing a real credential disclosure whose operational impact depends heavily on local log access and BIOS management policy.
Likely operational severity is Actionable Moderate, with manual review required to determine log accessibility, whether kernel logs are readable by non-root users or services, and whether the BIOS admin password protects security-relevant firmware settings in the target environment.
5. One-sentence report phrase
dell-wmi-sysman can expose the plaintext BIOS admin password in kernel logs when set_attribute() dumps the BIOS attribute request buffer, allowing a local log-readable attacker to recover the credential and potentially affect firmware settings.
6. Manual review recommendation
MANUAL CHECK REQUIRED
Reason: this is a concrete plaintext credential disclosure with environment-dependent log access and possible downstream BIOS integrity impact.
7. Call-site confidence
Call-site confidence: high
======================================================================
UPSTREAM PATCH SUMMARY
======================================================================
Patch: platform/x86: dell-wmi-sysman: Don't hex dump attribute security buffer
Commit: ceeee18c927958b74a04b92cf084fc496fa21e8b
Upstream URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=ceeee18c927958b74a04b92cf084fc496fa21e8b
Commit description:
set_attribute() populates the security area of the BIOS attribute request
buffer with the current admin password via populate_security_buffer(), then
dumps the whole request buffer with print_hex_dump_bytes(). This can expose
the plaintext admin password in the kernel log.
The same issue was fixed for the password attribute path by
commit d1a196e ("platform/x86: dell-wmi-sysman: Don't hex dump
plaintext password data"). Remove the remaining dump from the BIOS
attribute path.
Fixes: e8a60aa ("platform/x86: Introduce support for Systems Management Driver over WMI for Dell Systems")
Cc: [email protected]
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5
Signed-off-by: HyeongJun An <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Changed files:
drivers/platform/x86/dell/dell-wmi-sysman/biosattr-interface.c
Diff excerpt:
Not included in this email. See the upstream URL for the full patch.
Full patch:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=ceeee18c927958b74a04b92cf084fc496fa21e8b
======================================================================
DETAILED REPORT METHODOLOGY
======================================================================
The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-89444 can be found here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-89444
The original CVE announcement normally does not include a security-level
estimate. In particular, it may not contain a CVSS assessment, an impact
level, or enough information to determine whether the reported bug is a
practically relevant security issue. One purpose of this parallel CVE list
is to provide that missing technical and prioritization information.
The original goal of the AL-KERNEL project was to prioritize Linux kernel
CVE analysis automatically before manual review. The system can also help
identify non-security issues that may be suitable for automatic closure.
This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel
vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin.
The first analysis stage combines an autonomous classifier with additional
LLM-based analysis. The autonomous classifier runs locally on a CPU and is
based on a backpropagation neural network. Together, these mechanisms
produce a technical vulnerability description, identify likely weakness
types, estimate CVSS severity, and provide input for ActionableScore.
Two CVSS estimates are retained because incomplete kernel vulnerability
information often permits more than one defensible interpretation:
Conservative CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
The Best / paranoid CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
The Best / paranoid CVSS score: 6.1
The conservative vector represents a lower-impact interpretation.
The Best/paranoid vector intentionally represents a plausible upper-bound
interpretation and should not automatically be treated as demonstrated
real-world impact.
CVSS may also need to be adjusted for a particular Linux deployment,
because actual reachability, privileges, enabled kernel configuration,
hardware, namespaces, exposed device nodes, and other environmental
conditions can differ significantly between systems.
A separate ActionableScore mechanism evaluates practical remediation
urgency. Its analysis may include reachability, attack prerequisites,
subsystem exposure, memory-corruption characteristics, denial-of-service
reliability, and possible confidentiality, integrity, or
privilege-escalation impact.
Conservative ActionableScore: 4
Paranoid ActionableScore: 5
The final base severity is taken directly from the second tab-separated
field of the AL-KERNEL classification result. ActionableScore does not
replace or independently override that final AL-KERNEL decision, and
if ActionableScore adjusted impact level of ALKERNEL, then you would see
self-readable flags above like INCREASED_TO_HIGH_BASED_ON_ACTIONABLESCOREHIGHEREQTHAN7.
For an AL-KERNEL result of MODERATE, this report uses the following
additional presentation split:
ActionableScore below 5 -> MODERATE REGULAR
ActionableScore 5 or more -> MODERATE 7.0
The distinction between MODERATE REGULAR and MODERATE 7.0 makes it
possible to identify Moderate issues that should receive manual analysis
and fixes before lower-priority MODERATE REGULAR issues. In many cases,
MODERATE REGULAR fixes may wait for a later rebase or routine update.
There is one override in which MODERATE REGULAR becomes MODERATE 7.0
even when the ActionableScore is below 5. When the AL-KERNEL result
contains the KPANIC flag, a MODERATE result is always presented as
MODERATE 7.0. The KPANIC flag selected with few regexps without
usage of AI at all, so it helps to detect cases when Kernel Crash happens
and similar (to filter False-Negative results from the LLM usage).
KPANIC indicates that a reliable kernel crash, kernel panic, or similarly
serious kernel availability impact was identified by the classification
workflow.
AL-KERNEL base severity for this report: MODERATE
KPANIC detected for this report: YES
Published priority for this report (same as in Subject): MODERATE 7.0
These results are intended to support engineering triage. They are
machine-generated estimates, and cases marked for manual review should
be validated by a human security engineer before final disposition.
For more info read docs linked from here: https://kernelcve.org/
(and you can submit you own patch there to generate such a report
for non-existant CVE-id yet).
Note that in many cases this AI tool selects higher severity, than
real is (means you can expect Importants instead of Moderate 7.0 or
Moderates 7.0 instead of regular Moderates). If you see such cases,
please use reply email interface to add additional manual analyses
info to this particular CVE.
And please, please, let me know when you see Lows instead of Importants
or Important instead of Low (because particular for such cases I
need to tune this AI tool to make it better for this one and next similar).
My contact email for such notifications is [email protected] (and both
send reply to CVE record itself too and see "reply" button below for howto reply).
reply other threads:[~2026-09-12 0:58 UTC|newest]
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