From: AL-KERNEL <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Subject: [CVE-2026-89846][IMPORTANT] scsi: qla2xxx: Bound rsp_info_len to avoid OOB sense-data read
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 10:07:40 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)
CVE: CVE-2026-89846
Priority: IMPORTANT
AL-KERNEL base severity: IMPORTANT
KPANIC flag: NO
Patch: scsi: qla2xxx: Bound rsp_info_len to avoid OOB sense-data read
Commit: 125b12861c726e58448bb95d55b04851fb131d1f
Upstream patch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=125b12861c726e58448bb95d55b04851fb131d1f
Original CVE announcement: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-89846
Analysis date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 10:07:40 -0400
ActionableScore: 6
ActionableScore lower bound: 5
Actionable bucket: Actionable Moderate / Strong Important candidate requiring manual review
Manual review required: YES
Summary:
No one-sentence report phrase was found.
======================================================================
ABOUT THIS REPORT
======================================================================
The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-89846 is available here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-89846
The original announcement does not normally provide a security severity
estimate, CVSS assessment, or enough information to determine whether the
reported kernel bug represents a practically relevant security issue.
This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel
vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin. It combines
an autonomous classifier with LLM-assisted technical analysis and a
separate ActionableScore mechanism.
The purpose of this report is to prioritize Linux kernel CVEs before
manual review, identify cases that require prompt investigation, and
support automatic closure of issues that are unlikely to have meaningful
security impact.
Published priority for this report: IMPORTANT
Manual review required: YES
A detailed explanation of the methodology and priority rules is included
at the end of this message.
======================================================================
AL-KERNEL CLASSIFICATION RESULT
======================================================================
CVE-2026-89846 IMPORTANT https://www.kernelcve.org/list/?q=CVE-2026-89846 CHECK WITH IMPACT FROM ORIG NN IMPORTANT Maybe valid. Check manually. Hints by AL-KERNEL: The best (paranoid) CVSS is 'AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H';CWE-125;CWE-191;*CWE-200;Other CVSS 'AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N';BEST CVSS score: '8.1';DESCR 'An out of bounds read in the qla2xxx SCSI status path can occur because rsp_info_len from the target FCP response is not bounded before it is used to advance sense_data and shrink par_sense_len. A hostile or buggy storage target can report an rsp_info_len larger than the IOCB data area, causing an unsigned underflow and allowing qla2x00_handle_sense to copy data from outside the valid response buffer into the command sense buffer. For the CVSS the PR:N is used for the paranoid score because the attacker does not need local privileges on the victim host when they control a reachable Fibre Channel or SCSI target endpoint. The issue is adjacent network reachable in SAN or storage fabric deployments rather than public Internet reachable. Impact is at least confidentiality loss through kernel or response ring memory disclosure, and the paranoid interpretation also keeps availability high because an out of bounds kernel read from a bad pointer may crash the host.';YES REQUIRES MANUAL CHECK; ,and ActionableScore result is Actionable Moderate / Strong Important candidate requiring manual review (with actual score 6) YES WRITE OOB LEAK HARDWARE LINUS NO NO checked
======================================================================
ACTIONABLESCORE ANALYSIS
======================================================================
ActionableScore=6
ActionableScoreLower=5
PrimitiveClass=CLASS_A
RealUAF=NO
HostAdminRequired=NO
NamespaceScopedPrivilege=NO
ImportantCandidate=YES
ManualReview=REQUIRED
AutoDowngradeAllowed=NO
1. ActionableScore
* Raw conservative score: 5
* Conservative score: 5
* Raw paranoid score: 6
* Paranoid score: 6
* Final recommended bucket: **Actionable Moderate / Strong Important candidate requiring manual review**::
No floor or cap was applied. The paranoid score is emitted as the final ActionableScore because the OOB read has a concrete disclosure path and a plausible host crash path.
2. Signal breakdown
Positive signals:
* +1 Firmware-mediated external influence. A hostile or buggy Fibre Channel / SCSI target can influence `rsp_info_len` through the FCP response, but the path is mediated by storage fabric and HBA/firmware rather than being ordinary Internet packet reachability.
* +1 Concrete OOB read primitive. `rsp_info_len` can advance `sense_data` outside the IOCB data area and underflow `par_sense_len`, allowing `memcpy()` from an out-of-bounds kernel pointer.
* +1 Confidentiality plausible. The copied data is placed into the command sense buffer, creating a plausible kernel / response-ring / heap memory disclosure path.
* +1 Practical chain strongly implied. The patch description gives the full chain: attacker-controlled response length -> unsigned underflow -> bounds cap bypass -> OOB memcpy into sense buffer.
* +1 Important storage path. The issue is in the qla2xxx SCSI/Fibre Channel status completion path, which is part of an important kernel storage data path.
* Paranoid +1 Reliable kernel crash / strong DoS. An out-of-bounds kernel read from a pointer advanced beyond the intended response area can plausibly fault and crash the host.
Non-awarded or withheld signals:
* RealUAF not awarded. This is not a use-after-free or stale lifetime bug.
* Strong LPE not awarded. No controlled write, credential overwrite, callback control, or privilege escalation chain is established.
* Integrity not awarded. The demonstrated primitive is read-only.
* Arbitrary read not awarded. The target influences an offset/length relationship, but no arbitrary kernel address selection is established.
* Direct remote network reachability +2 not awarded. The attacker is a reachable storage target on SAN / Fibre Channel / SCSI fabric, not an arbitrary IP network peer.
* Extra availability not awarded. The possible crash is counted once only.
* Controlled reclaim / object replacement not demonstrated.
* No race or timing penalty. The bug is an ordered parsing/arithmetic flaw, not a narrow timing race.
Negative signals:
* No host-admin penalty. The attacker model is a hostile or compromised target endpoint influencing FCP response data, not a local host administrator on the victim.
* No rare-hardware penalty applied. qla2xxx is hardware-specific, but enterprise Fibre Channel SAN exposure is a realistic deployment model and the prompt requires concrete evidence before applying rare/physical-only reduction.
3. Reachability analysis
The plausible attacker is a hostile, compromised, or buggy Fibre Channel / SCSI target that can return an FCP response with an excessive `rsp_info_len`. The vulnerable host must use the qla2xxx driver and communicate with that target through the storage fabric.
This is adjacent-network / storage-fabric reachability, not public Internet reachability. The attacker does not need local code execution or host-admin privileges on the victim if they already control a reachable target endpoint. Prior storage provisioning or zoning may be required in real deployments, but the supplied evidence does not establish that host-admin privilege is required by the attacker on the victim.
Namespace-scoped privilege is not relevant. No user namespace or network namespace capability path is involved. No race repeatability issue is present because the target-controlled field is processed directly in the completion/status path.
4. Primitive and severity interpretation
The exact primitive is an attacker-influenced out-of-bounds kernel read caused by failing to clamp `rsp_info_len` before pointer arithmetic and unsigned subtraction. The underflowed `par_sense_len` defeats the later cap in `qla2x00_handle_sense()`, allowing up to `SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE` bytes to be copied from outside the intended IOCB data area into the command sense buffer.
This is not active structured-object UAF and not fixed stale storage. It is a bounded but concrete OOB read with a plausible disclosure path. The demonstrated consequence is kernel/response-ring/heap memory disclosure into sense data. The paranoid consequence is host DoS if the OOB read faults.
PrimitiveClass is CLASS_A because a concrete kernel memory disclosure primitive is established, although it is not an arbitrary read/write primitive. ImportantCandidate is YES because adjacent attacker-controlled storage input can trigger a kernel OOB read with disclosure and possible host crash. AutoDowngradeAllowed is NO because automatically closing this as ordinary Moderate would lose a concrete disclosure primitive in an important storage path.
Likely operational severity is Actionable Moderate at minimum, with Strong Important review warranted for environments where untrusted or compromised storage targets are realistic.
5. One-sentence report phrase
A hostile Fibre Channel or SCSI target can provide an oversized FCP response length that underflows qla2xxx sense-data bounds checking, causing an out-of-bounds kernel read into the SCSI sense buffer with potential kernel memory disclosure and possible host DoS.
6. Manual review recommendation
MANUAL CHECK REQUIRED
Reason: this is not just a crash-only parser issue. The patch-supported primitive includes attacker-influenced OOB kernel memory read with a plausible disclosure path from an adjacent storage target.
7. Call-site confidence
Call-site confidence: high
======================================================================
UPSTREAM PATCH SUMMARY
======================================================================
Patch: scsi: qla2xxx: Bound rsp_info_len to avoid OOB sense-data read
Commit: 125b12861c726e58448bb95d55b04851fb131d1f
Upstream URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=125b12861c726e58448bb95d55b04851fb131d1f
Commit description:
In qla2x00_status_entry(), the FWI2 status path advances sense_data and
shrinks par_sense_len by rsp_info_len:
if (IS_FWI2_CAPABLE(ha)) {
sense_data += rsp_info_len;
par_sense_len -= rsp_info_len;
}
rsp_info_len is a 32-bit value taken directly from the target's FCP
response (sf.rsp_data_len), while par_sense_len is the IOCB data area
size (28 bytes for 24xx, 60 bytes for 29xx). A hostile or buggy target
reporting an rsp_info_len larger than par_sense_len makes the unsigned
subtraction underflow to a huge value and advances sense_data out of
bounds.
The underflowed par_sense_len then defeats the cap in
qla2x00_handle_sense():
if (sense_len > par_sense_len)
sense_len = par_sense_len;
memcpy(cp->sense_buffer, sense_data, sense_len);
so the memcpy reads up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE bytes from the
out-of-bounds sense_data pointer, leaking adjacent response-ring/heap
memory into the command's sense buffer.
Clamp rsp_info_len to par_sense_len before the subtraction so
par_sense_len can never underflow and sense_data stays within the IOCB
data area. The fix sits before the comp_status switch, covering both
qla2x00_handle_sense() call sites.
Fixes: 5544213 ("[SCSI] qla2xxx: Correct extended sense-data handling.")
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Sashiko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Changed files:
drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_isr.c
Diff excerpt:
Not included in this email. See the upstream URL for the full patch.
Full patch:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=125b12861c726e58448bb95d55b04851fb131d1f
======================================================================
DETAILED REPORT METHODOLOGY
======================================================================
The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-89846 can be found here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-89846
The original CVE announcement normally does not include a security-level
estimate. In particular, it may not contain a CVSS assessment, an impact
level, or enough information to determine whether the reported bug is a
practically relevant security issue. One purpose of this parallel CVE list
is to provide that missing technical and prioritization information.
The original goal of the AL-KERNEL project was to prioritize Linux kernel
CVE analysis automatically before manual review. The system can also help
identify non-security issues that may be suitable for automatic closure.
This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel
vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin.
The first analysis stage combines an autonomous classifier with additional
LLM-based analysis. The autonomous classifier runs locally on a CPU and is
based on a backpropagation neural network. Together, these mechanisms
produce a technical vulnerability description, identify likely weakness
types, estimate CVSS severity, and provide input for ActionableScore.
Two CVSS estimates are retained because incomplete kernel vulnerability
information often permits more than one defensible interpretation:
Conservative CVSS vector: AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
The Best / paranoid CVSS vector: AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
The Best / paranoid CVSS score: 8.1
The conservative vector represents a lower-impact interpretation.
The Best/paranoid vector intentionally represents a plausible upper-bound
interpretation and should not automatically be treated as demonstrated
real-world impact.
CVSS may also need to be adjusted for a particular Linux deployment,
because actual reachability, privileges, enabled kernel configuration,
hardware, namespaces, exposed device nodes, and other environmental
conditions can differ significantly between systems.
A separate ActionableScore mechanism evaluates practical remediation
urgency. Its analysis may include reachability, attack prerequisites,
subsystem exposure, memory-corruption characteristics, denial-of-service
reliability, and possible confidentiality, integrity, or
privilege-escalation impact.
Conservative ActionableScore: 5
Paranoid ActionableScore: 6
The final base severity is taken directly from the second tab-separated
field of the AL-KERNEL classification result. ActionableScore does not
replace or independently override that final AL-KERNEL decision, and
if ActionableScore adjusted impact level of ALKERNEL, then you would see
self-readable flags above like INCREASED_TO_HIGH_BASED_ON_ACTIONABLESCOREHIGHEREQTHAN7.
For an AL-KERNEL result of MODERATE, this report uses the following
additional presentation split:
ActionableScore below 5 -> MODERATE REGULAR
ActionableScore 5 or more -> MODERATE 7.0
The distinction between MODERATE REGULAR and MODERATE 7.0 makes it
possible to identify Moderate issues that should receive manual analysis
and fixes before lower-priority MODERATE REGULAR issues. In many cases,
MODERATE REGULAR fixes may wait for a later rebase or routine update.
There is one override in which MODERATE REGULAR becomes MODERATE 7.0
even when the ActionableScore is below 5. When the AL-KERNEL result
contains the KPANIC flag, a MODERATE result is always presented as
MODERATE 7.0. The KPANIC flag selected with few regexps without
usage of AI at all, so it helps to detect cases when Kernel Crash happens
and similar (to filter False-Negative results from the LLM usage).
KPANIC indicates that a reliable kernel crash, kernel panic, or similarly
serious kernel availability impact was identified by the classification
workflow.
AL-KERNEL base severity for this report: IMPORTANT
KPANIC detected for this report: NO
Published priority for this report (same as in Subject): IMPORTANT
These results are intended to support engineering triage. They are
machine-generated estimates, and cases marked for manual review should
be validated by a human security engineer before final disposition.
For more info read docs linked from here: https://kernelcve.org/
(and you can submit you own patch there to generate such a report
for non-existant CVE-id yet).
Note that in many cases this AI tool selects higher severity, than
real is (means you can expect Importants instead of Moderate 7.0 or
Moderates 7.0 instead of regular Moderates). If you see such cases,
please use reply email interface to add additional manual analyses
info to this particular CVE.
And please, please, let me know when you see Lows instead of Importants
or Important instead of Low (because particular for such cases I
need to tune this AI tool to make it better for this one and next similar).
My contact email for such notifications is [email protected] (and both
send reply to CVE record itself too and see "reply" button below for howto reply).
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