From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: AL-KERNEL To: kernel-cve@kernelcve.org Subject: [CVE-2026-89858][MODERATE 7.0] scsi: qla2xxx: Bound image count in qla2x00_update_fru_versions() Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 13:58:06 -0400 Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-AL-KERNEL-CVE: CVE-2026-89858 X-AL-KERNEL-Priority: MODERATE 7.0 X-AL-KERNEL-Severity: MODERATE 7.0 X-AL-KERNEL-Base-Severity: MODERATE X-AL-KERNEL-KPANIC: YES X-AL-KERNEL-ActionableScore: 5 X-AL-KERNEL-ActionableScore-Lower: 4 X-AL-KERNEL-Commit: af733bbfcf667af1871a2735fba2835b0da71efb List-Id: CVE: CVE-2026-89858 Priority: MODERATE 7.0 AL-KERNEL base severity: MODERATE KPANIC flag: YES Patch: scsi: qla2xxx: Bound image count in qla2x00_update_fru_versions() Commit: af733bbfcf667af1871a2735fba2835b0da71efb Upstream patch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=af733bbfcf667af1871a2735fba2835b0da71efb Original CVE announcement: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-89858 Analysis date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 13:58:06 -0400 ActionableScore: 5 ActionableScore lower bound: 4 Actionable bucket: Actionable Moderate Manual review required: YES Summary: A user supplied BSG image count in qla2x00_update_fru_versions() can make the driver read beyond a fixed kernel stack buffer and write adjacent stack data to FRU/SFP device storage, requiring local BSG access and manual review for possible information disclosure. ====================================================================== ABOUT THIS REPORT ====================================================================== The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-89858 is available here: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-89858 The original announcement does not normally provide a security severity estimate, CVSS assessment, or enough information to determine whether the reported kernel bug represents a practically relevant security issue. This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin. It combines an autonomous classifier with LLM-assisted technical analysis and a separate ActionableScore mechanism. The purpose of this report is to prioritize Linux kernel CVEs before manual review, identify cases that require prompt investigation, and support automatic closure of issues that are unlikely to have meaningful security impact. Published priority for this report: MODERATE 7.0 Manual review required: YES A detailed explanation of the methodology and priority rules is included at the end of this message. ====================================================================== AL-KERNEL CLASSIFICATION RESULT ====================================================================== CVE-2026-89858 MODERATE https://www.kernelcve.org/list/?q=CVE-2026-89858 CHECK WITH IMPACT FROM ORIG NN LOW Maybe valid. Check manually. Hints by AL-KERNEL: The best (paranoid) CVSS is 'AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L';CWE-126;*CWE-20;*CWE-200;Other CVSS 'AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L';BEST CVSS score: '6.6';DESCR 'A bounds check is missing in qla2x00_update_fru_versions() for the user supplied BSG request count. The function copies the request into a fixed 256 byte stack buffer and then iterates over qla_image_version entries based on list count, so an oversized count can make the image pointer read beyond the stack buffer and pass adjacent kernel stack data to qla2x00_write_sfp(). For the CVSS the PR:L is used because a local user or process needs access to the qla2xxx BSG interface, but full host administration is not necessarily required in delegated storage environments. The issue is not network reachable and requires local access to the SCSI BSG control path on a system with affected qla2xxx hardware. Impact is at least local denial of service or device data corruption, and in the paranoid case it may expose kernel stack data if the written FRU or SFP data can be read back.';YES REQUIRES MANUAL CHECK; ,and ActionableScore result is Actionable Moderate (with actual score 5) YES SIMPLEFIX HARDWARE LINUS KPANIC INCREASED_FROM_LOW_BASED_ON_REQUIREMANUALCHECK NO NO checked ====================================================================== ACTIONABLESCORE ANALYSIS ====================================================================== ActionableScore=5 ActionableScoreLower=4 PrimitiveClass=CLASS_C RealUAF=NO HostAdminRequired=UNKNOWN NamespaceScopedPrivilege=NO ImportantCandidate=NO ManualReview=REQUIRED AutoDowngradeAllowed=NO ## 1. ActionableScore * Raw conservative score: 4 * Conservative score: 4 * Raw paranoid score: 5 * Paranoid score: 5 * Final recommended bucket: **Actionable Moderate**:: No floor or cap changed the score. ## 2. Signal breakdown Conservative signals: * +1: Attacker-controlled count drives an out-of-bounds read past a fixed 256 byte kernel stack buffer. * +1: Kernel stack bytes are passed to `qla2x00_write_sfp()`, creating a plausible device-visible disclosure sink. * +1: The same malformed request can cause unintended FRU/SFP writes using data read from adjacent stack memory, giving limited device-integrity concern. * +1: The patch restores a concrete size/count invariant between `list->count`, `qla_image_version[]`, and the fixed `bsg[DMA_POOL_SIZE]` stack buffer. Paranoid additional signal: * +1: If the written FRU/SFP data can be read back by the same storage-management path, the issue becomes a more actionable kernel stack disclosure candidate. Non-awarded signals: * RealUAF not awarded. No use-after-free or stale lifetime primitive is shown. * Strong corruption not awarded. No OOB write to kernel memory, arbitrary write, controlled reclaim, or refcount/lifetime mutation is shown. * Reliable kernel crash not awarded. The supplied evidence primarily shows OOB stack read and device write, not a demonstrated panic. * Remote reachability not awarded. The path is local SCSI BSG control, not packet-triggered network input. * Local unprivileged trigger not awarded. Below-host-admin BSG access is plausible in delegated storage setups but not proven by the supplied evidence. * Host-admin penalty not applied. Host-admin-equivalent privilege is not positively established. * Rare hardware penalty not applied. qla2xxx hardware is required, but the evidence does not justify treating it as physical-only attacker access or an unusually rare configuration for affected deployments. ## 3. Reachability analysis The attacker needs local access to the qla2xxx BSG control path and must be able to submit the vendor request handled by `qla2x00_update_fru_versions()`. The input is user supplied and the vulnerable field is `list->count`. The complete privilege boundary is not fully resolved from the supplied patch. Access to BSG devices is often restricted, but it may be delegated to storage-management users or services. Therefore `HostAdminRequired=UNKNOWN`, not YES and not NO. The operation is not meaningfully namespace-scoped. This is a SCSI adapter management path, not a user-created network namespace object. Prior setup includes the presence of affected qla2xxx hardware and an exposed BSG device. No network trigger is established. No race or timing dependency is involved. ## 4. Primitive and severity interpretation The exact primitive is an attacker-controlled read-only out-of-bounds access from a fixed kernel stack buffer. `list->count` is trusted even though only a small number of `struct qla_image_version` entries fit inside `bsg[DMA_POOL_SIZE]`. A larger count advances `image` beyond the copied request and causes adjacent kernel stack memory to be copied into `sfp` and sent to the device via `qla2x00_write_sfp()`. This is not an active structured UAF, not fixed stale storage, and not a repeated release/refcount case. There is no first lifetime-ending operation, no surviving dangling reference, and no second lifetime mutation. PrimitiveClass is CLASS_C because the established primitive is an invalid/OOB stack read with a plausible disclosure/device-write sink, not kernel memory corruption or a lifetime violation. Demonstrated consequence is malformed local device-management behavior and possible kernel stack exposure to device-visible storage. Speculative consequence is broader information disclosure if the attacker can read back the affected FRU/SFP data. There is no demonstrated privilege escalation. ImportantCandidate=NO because no Class A primitive and no strong Class B lifetime/corruption primitive is established. AutoDowngradeAllowed=NO because a concrete kernel stack OOB read with a plausible disclosure sink should not be automatically closed without checking whether the written device data is readable by the attacker. Likely operational severity: Actionable Moderate. ## 5. One-sentence report phrase A user supplied BSG image count in qla2x00_update_fru_versions() can make the driver read beyond a fixed kernel stack buffer and write adjacent stack data to FRU/SFP device storage, requiring local BSG access and manual review for possible information disclosure. ## 6. Manual review recommendation MANUAL CHECK REQUIRED Reason: the patch establishes an OOB kernel stack read and a plausible device-visible disclosure path, but the practical confidentiality impact depends on whether the attacker can read back the written FRU/SFP data. ## 7. Call-site confidence Call-site confidence: high ====================================================================== UPSTREAM PATCH SUMMARY ====================================================================== Patch: scsi: qla2xxx: Bound image count in qla2x00_update_fru_versions() Commit: af733bbfcf667af1871a2735fba2835b0da71efb Upstream URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=af733bbfcf667af1871a2735fba2835b0da71efb Commit description: qla2x00_update_fru_versions() copies the user-supplied BSG request into a fixed 256-byte stack buffer (bsg[DMA_POOL_SIZE]) and then iterates list->count times over the qla_image_version array embedded in that buffer, advancing the image pointer each iteration. count is taken directly from user input with no upper bound, while only (DMA_POOL_SIZE - sizeof(list->count)) / sizeof(struct qla_image_version) = 6 entries actually fit. A larger count walks the image pointer off the end of the stack buffer, reading adjacent kernel stack memory and sending it to the device via qla2x00_write_sfp(). Reject requests whose declared count does not fit in the buffer. Fixes: 697a4bc ("[SCSI] qla2xxx: Provide method for updating I2C attached VPD.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260723050413.3897522-56-njavali@marvell.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Changed files: drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_bsg.c Diff excerpt: Not included in this email. See the upstream URL for the full patch. Full patch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=af733bbfcf667af1871a2735fba2835b0da71efb ====================================================================== DETAILED REPORT METHODOLOGY ====================================================================== The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-89858 can be found here: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-89858 The original CVE announcement normally does not include a security-level estimate. In particular, it may not contain a CVSS assessment, an impact level, or enough information to determine whether the reported bug is a practically relevant security issue. One purpose of this parallel CVE list is to provide that missing technical and prioritization information. The original goal of the AL-KERNEL project was to prioritize Linux kernel CVE analysis automatically before manual review. The system can also help identify non-security issues that may be suitable for automatic closure. This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin. The first analysis stage combines an autonomous classifier with additional LLM-based analysis. The autonomous classifier runs locally on a CPU and is based on a backpropagation neural network. Together, these mechanisms produce a technical vulnerability description, identify likely weakness types, estimate CVSS severity, and provide input for ActionableScore. Two CVSS estimates are retained because incomplete kernel vulnerability information often permits more than one defensible interpretation: Conservative CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L The Best / paranoid CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L The Best / paranoid CVSS score: 6.6 The conservative vector represents a lower-impact interpretation. The Best/paranoid vector intentionally represents a plausible upper-bound interpretation and should not automatically be treated as demonstrated real-world impact. CVSS may also need to be adjusted for a particular Linux deployment, because actual reachability, privileges, enabled kernel configuration, hardware, namespaces, exposed device nodes, and other environmental conditions can differ significantly between systems. A separate ActionableScore mechanism evaluates practical remediation urgency. Its analysis may include reachability, attack prerequisites, subsystem exposure, memory-corruption characteristics, denial-of-service reliability, and possible confidentiality, integrity, or privilege-escalation impact. Conservative ActionableScore: 4 Paranoid ActionableScore: 5 The final base severity is taken directly from the second tab-separated field of the AL-KERNEL classification result. ActionableScore does not replace or independently override that final AL-KERNEL decision, and if ActionableScore adjusted impact level of ALKERNEL, then you would see self-readable flags above like INCREASED_TO_HIGH_BASED_ON_ACTIONABLESCOREHIGHEREQTHAN7. For an AL-KERNEL result of MODERATE, this report uses the following additional presentation split: ActionableScore below 5 -> MODERATE REGULAR ActionableScore 5 or more -> MODERATE 7.0 The distinction between MODERATE REGULAR and MODERATE 7.0 makes it possible to identify Moderate issues that should receive manual analysis and fixes before lower-priority MODERATE REGULAR issues. In many cases, MODERATE REGULAR fixes may wait for a later rebase or routine update. There is one override in which MODERATE REGULAR becomes MODERATE 7.0 even when the ActionableScore is below 5. When the AL-KERNEL result contains the KPANIC flag, a MODERATE result is always presented as MODERATE 7.0. The KPANIC flag selected with few regexps without usage of AI at all, so it helps to detect cases when Kernel Crash happens and similar (to filter False-Negative results from the LLM usage). KPANIC indicates that a reliable kernel crash, kernel panic, or similarly serious kernel availability impact was identified by the classification workflow. AL-KERNEL base severity for this report: MODERATE KPANIC detected for this report: YES Published priority for this report (same as in Subject): MODERATE 7.0 These results are intended to support engineering triage. They are machine-generated estimates, and cases marked for manual review should be validated by a human security engineer before final disposition. For more info read docs linked from here: https://kernelcve.org/ (and you can submit you own patch there to generate such a report for non-existant CVE-id yet). Note that in many cases this AI tool selects higher severity, than real is (means you can expect Importants instead of Moderate 7.0 or Moderates 7.0 instead of regular Moderates). If you see such cases, please use reply email interface to add additional manual analyses info to this particular CVE. And please, please, let me know when you see Lows instead of Importants or Important instead of Low (because particular for such cases I need to tune this AI tool to make it better for this one and next similar). My contact email for such notifications is alexanjelausa@gmail.com (and both send reply to CVE record itself too and see "reply" button below for howto reply).