From: AL-KERNEL <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Subject: [CVE-2026-90314][MODERATE REGULAR] remoteproc: fix OOB read via signed offset in rsc_table_for_each_entry() [ Upstream
Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 21:31:41 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)
CVE: CVE-2026-90314
Priority: MODERATE REGULAR
AL-KERNEL base severity: MODERATE
KPANIC flag: NO
Patch: remoteproc: fix OOB read via signed offset in rsc_table_for_each_entry() [ Upstream
Commit: 0d385be8f199b349f325cf90584b47b6a044ea79
Upstream patch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=0d385be8f199b349f325cf90584b47b6a044ea79
Original CVE announcement: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-90314
Analysis date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 21:31:41 -0400
ActionableScore: 3
ActionableScore lower bound: unknown
Actionable bucket: Borderline / manual review recommended
Manual review required: YES
Summary:
No one-sentence report phrase was found.
======================================================================
ABOUT THIS REPORT
======================================================================
The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-90314 is available here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-90314
The original announcement does not normally provide a security severity
estimate, CVSS assessment, or enough information to determine whether the
reported kernel bug represents a practically relevant security issue.
This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel
vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin. It combines
an autonomous classifier with LLM-assisted technical analysis and a
separate ActionableScore mechanism.
The purpose of this report is to prioritize Linux kernel CVEs before
manual review, identify cases that require prompt investigation, and
support automatic closure of issues that are unlikely to have meaningful
security impact.
Published priority for this report: MODERATE REGULAR
Manual review required: YES
A detailed explanation of the methodology and priority rules is included
at the end of this message.
======================================================================
AL-KERNEL CLASSIFICATION RESULT
======================================================================
CVE-2026-90314 MODERATE https://www.kernelcve.org/list/?q=CVE-2026-90314 CHECK WITH IMPACT FROM ORIG NN IMPORTANT Maybe valid. Check manually. Hints by AL-KERNEL: The best (paranoid) CVSS is 'AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H';CWE-195;CWE-125;*CWE-20;Other CVSS 'AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H';BEST CVSS score: '6.6';DESCR 'A signed conversion error in remoteproc resource table parsing can turn a firmware supplied u32 offset into a negative int and place the resource header before the allocated table buffer. A crafted offset such as 0xFFFFFFF0 can bypass the old availability calculation and cause an out of bounds read of hdr type. The invalid resource pointer and derived offset can then reach a callback, which may cause a kernel crash, remote processor initialization failure, or limited exposure of adjacent kernel data depending on the callback behavior. For the CVSS the PR:L value is used for the paranoid score because some systems delegate remoteproc or firmware management to a restricted service, container root, or another limited local account. Typical systems require administrative firmware control and are better represented by PR:H in the base score. The issue is not directly network reachable. Impact is at least a local denial of service and may include limited confidentiality or integrity impact because an out of bounds resource header and pointer reach further parsing code.';YES REQUIRES MANUAL CHECK; ,and ActionableScore result is Borderline / manual review recommended (with actual score 3) SKIP CVE-2026-90314 UNKNOWN SKIP No affected files built, so skip this CVE NO - - unknown MAYBE WRITE OOB SIMPLEFIX IMPROVEONLY LINUS DECREASED_TO_MODERATEREG_BASED_ON_ACTIONABLESCORELESSTHAN4 - - checked
======================================================================
ACTIONABLESCORE ANALYSIS
======================================================================
ActionableScore=3
PrimitiveClass=CLASS_C
RealUAF=NO
HostAdminRequired=UNKNOWN
NamespaceScopedPrivilege=UNKNOWN
ImportantCandidate=NO
ManualReview=RECOMMENDED
AutoDowngradeAllowed=YES
1. ActionableScore
* Raw conservative score: 3
* Conservative score: 3
* Raw paranoid score: 3
* Paranoid score: 3
* No floor or cap was applied.
* Final recommended bucket: **Borderline / manual review recommended**::
2. Signal breakdown
Positive signals:
* +1 Firmware-mediated external influence. The resource-table offset is supplied by firmware and can be deliberately crafted, but firmware or device mediation prevents classification as directly network-triggerable.
* +1 Weak or indirect corruption candidate. Signed conversion permits pointer construction before the resource-table buffer, an OOB read of `hdr->type`, and delivery of an invalid `rsc` pointer and derived lengths to a callback.
* +1 Reliable kernel crash or strong DoS. A sufficiently large crafted offset can place `hdr` far outside the valid allocation, making a kernel fault during `hdr->type` access technically credible.
No negative points were applied:
* No host-admin penalty because host-admin-equivalent privilege is not positively established for every firmware-delivery model.
* No rare-hardware penalty because the supplied evidence does not establish uncommon physical hardware as a necessary condition.
* No race penalty because this is a deterministic validation and signed-conversion defect.
Material non-awarded signals:
* No direct remote-reachability bonus. Device or firmware mediation is material.
* No confidentiality point. The OOB value is consumed internally, with no demonstrated path returning adjacent kernel bytes to userspace, a network peer, or the device.
* No integrity point. No write, ownership change, or unauthorized modification is established.
* No strong semantic-reinterpretation bonus. The bug creates an invalid pointer and resource interpretation, but no attacker-controlled active descriptor, ownership record, or operation is shown to be accepted successfully.
* No arbitrary or directed write is demonstrated.
* No controlled target, controlled kernel payload, callback hijack, or controlled object replacement is demonstrated.
* No additional Availability point was awarded because it would duplicate the same potential kernel fault.
* No UAF, stale lifetime operation, double release, or refcount mutation exists.
* The supplied CVSS hint using C:L/I:L/A:H does not independently establish ActionableScore confidentiality or integrity signals.
3. Reachability analysis
The immediate input is a resource table supplied by remote-processor firmware. An attacker therefore needs influence over that firmware image, the remote processor, or a firmware-management path that supplies the table.
The evidence does not establish whether the complete trigger requires host root, is delegated to a restricted firmware-management service, or can originate from a compromised remote processor independently of host administration. Therefore `HostAdminRequired=UNKNOWN`.
No user-namespace or network-namespace capability path is shown. The complete operation cannot be classified as namespace-scoped, so `NamespaceScopedPrivilege=UNKNOWN`.
The bug is not directly network-triggerable. A network compromise could potentially become relevant only through an additional firmware or device-control compromise, which is outside the demonstrated primitive.
No timing race is involved. Once a crafted table reaches this parser, the malformed offset deterministically affects pointer arithmetic. A remoteproc-capable platform and loading or receipt of its resource table are prerequisites, but the evidence does not support a rare-hardware penalty.
4. Primitive and severity interpretation
The exact primitive is a firmware-influenced OOB read caused by converting a `u32` resource offset to signed `int`. A value such as `0xFFFFFFF0` becomes negative, positions `hdr` before the table, bypasses the old size check, and allows `hdr->type` to be read outside the allocation.
The invalid `rsc` pointer, offset, and available length can subsequently reach a callback. This creates unresolved downstream parser risk, but the callback implementations and their behavior are not supplied. It is therefore not established that the callback writes through the pointer, discloses data, or performs a security-sensitive operation.
This is not a UAF and involves neither fixed stale storage nor an active structured stale object. There is no repeated release or refcount operation.
`PrimitiveClass=CLASS_C` because the demonstrated behavior is an invalid read and potentially fatal invalid-state path without an independently useful corruption, disclosure, or authorization primitive.
The patch-supported practical consequence is kernel crash, remote-processor initialization failure, or rejection/failure of resource processing. Further memory corruption, disclosure, or privilege escalation remains speculative.
`ImportantCandidate=NO` because no Class A primitive or strong unresolved Class B lifetime/corruption primitive is established. `AutoDowngradeAllowed=YES` because the demonstrated primitive remains a constrained OOB-read and DoS case. Manual review is still recommended because the invalid pointer crosses into an unspecified callback, and its concrete call sites could reveal a stronger secondary operation.
Likely operational severity is ordinary-to-borderline Moderate, depending on who controls the firmware and what the callbacks do with `rsc`.
5. One-sentence report phrase
A firmware-controlled signed offset can bypass remoteproc resource-table bounds validation and cause an OOB header read with an invalid resource pointer passed to a callback, creating a credible kernel DoS but no demonstrated disclosure, write, or privilege-escalation primitive.
6. Manual review recommendation
MANUAL CHECK RECOMMENDED
Review the callback implementations used with `rsc_table_for_each_entry()` to determine whether they only read and reject the invalid resource or can perform writes, allocations, disclosure, or security-sensitive configuration before detecting the malformed pointer.
7. Call-site confidence
Call-site confidence: medium
======================================================================
UPSTREAM PATCH SUMMARY
======================================================================
Patch: remoteproc: fix OOB read via signed offset in rsc_table_for_each_entry() [ Upstream
Commit: 0d385be8f199b349f325cf90584b47b6a044ea79
Upstream URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=0d385be8f199b349f325cf90584b47b6a044ea79
Changed files:
include/linux/rsc_table.h
Diff excerpt:
Not included in this email. See the upstream URL for the full patch.
Full patch:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=0d385be8f199b349f325cf90584b47b6a044ea79
======================================================================
DETAILED REPORT METHODOLOGY
======================================================================
The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-90314 can be found here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-90314
The original CVE announcement normally does not include a security-level
estimate. In particular, it may not contain a CVSS assessment, an impact
level, or enough information to determine whether the reported bug is a
practically relevant security issue. One purpose of this parallel CVE list
is to provide that missing technical and prioritization information.
The original goal of the AL-KERNEL project was to prioritize Linux kernel
CVE analysis automatically before manual review. The system can also help
identify non-security issues that may be suitable for automatic closure.
This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel
vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin.
The first analysis stage combines an autonomous classifier with additional
LLM-based analysis. The autonomous classifier runs locally on a CPU and is
based on a backpropagation neural network. Together, these mechanisms
produce a technical vulnerability description, identify likely weakness
types, estimate CVSS severity, and provide input for ActionableScore.
Two CVSS estimates are retained because incomplete kernel vulnerability
information often permits more than one defensible interpretation:
Conservative CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H
The Best / paranoid CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H
The Best / paranoid CVSS score: 6.6
The conservative vector represents a lower-impact interpretation.
The Best/paranoid vector intentionally represents a plausible upper-bound
interpretation and should not automatically be treated as demonstrated
real-world impact.
CVSS may also need to be adjusted for a particular Linux deployment,
because actual reachability, privileges, enabled kernel configuration,
hardware, namespaces, exposed device nodes, and other environmental
conditions can differ significantly between systems.
A separate ActionableScore mechanism evaluates practical remediation
urgency. Its analysis may include reachability, attack prerequisites,
subsystem exposure, memory-corruption characteristics, denial-of-service
reliability, and possible confidentiality, integrity, or
privilege-escalation impact.
Conservative ActionableScore: unknown
Paranoid ActionableScore: 3
The final base severity is taken directly from the second tab-separated
field of the AL-KERNEL classification result. ActionableScore does not
replace or independently override that final AL-KERNEL decision, and
if ActionableScore adjusted impact level of ALKERNEL, then you would see
self-readable flags above like INCREASED_TO_HIGH_BASED_ON_ACTIONABLESCOREHIGHEREQTHAN7.
For an AL-KERNEL result of MODERATE, this report uses the following
additional presentation split:
ActionableScore below 5 -> MODERATE REGULAR
ActionableScore 5 or more -> MODERATE 7.0
The distinction between MODERATE REGULAR and MODERATE 7.0 makes it
possible to identify Moderate issues that should receive manual analysis
and fixes before lower-priority MODERATE REGULAR issues. In many cases,
MODERATE REGULAR fixes may wait for a later rebase or routine update.
There is one override in which MODERATE REGULAR becomes MODERATE 7.0
even when the ActionableScore is below 5. When the AL-KERNEL result
contains the KPANIC flag, a MODERATE result is always presented as
MODERATE 7.0. The KPANIC flag selected with few regexps without
usage of AI at all, so it helps to detect cases when Kernel Crash happens
and similar (to filter False-Negative results from the LLM usage).
KPANIC indicates that a reliable kernel crash, kernel panic, or similarly
serious kernel availability impact was identified by the classification
workflow.
AL-KERNEL base severity for this report: MODERATE
KPANIC detected for this report: NO
Published priority for this report (same as in Subject): MODERATE REGULAR
These results are intended to support engineering triage. They are
machine-generated estimates, and cases marked for manual review should
be validated by a human security engineer before final disposition.
For more info read docs linked from here: https://kernelcve.org/
(and you can submit you own patch there to generate such a report
for non-existant CVE-id yet).
Note that in many cases this AI tool selects higher severity, than
real is (means you can expect Importants instead of Moderate 7.0 or
Moderates 7.0 instead of regular Moderates). If you see such cases,
please use reply email interface to add additional manual analyses
info to this particular CVE.
And please, please, let me know when you see Lows instead of Importants
or Important instead of Low (because particular for such cases I
need to tune this AI tool to make it better for this one and next similar).
My contact email for such notifications is [email protected] (and both
send reply to CVE record itself too and see "reply" button below for howto reply).
reply other threads:[~2026-09-18 1:31 UTC|newest]
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