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From: AL-KERNEL <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Subject: [CVE-2026-98839][MODERATE REGULAR] vt: selection: Fix unsigned underflow and slab-out-of-bounds read in paste_selection()
Date: Sat, 24 Oct 2026 11:36:41 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)

CVE: CVE-2026-98839
Priority: MODERATE REGULAR
AL-KERNEL base severity: MODERATE
KPANIC flag: NO
Patch: vt: selection: Fix unsigned underflow and slab-out-of-bounds read in paste_selection()
Commit: 037d7e3ca5c593092f4b0d471eb869a85cbddde0
Upstream patch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=037d7e3ca5c593092f4b0d471eb869a85cbddde0
Original CVE announcement: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-98839
Analysis date: Sat, 24 Oct 2026 11:36:41 -0400
ActionableScore: 2
ActionableScore lower bound: 1
Actionable bucket: Ordinary Moderate
Manual review required: NO

Summary:
A local race can underflow the VT selection length and copy up to 4094 bytes past a replacement selection buffer into the TTY input path.

======================================================================
ABOUT THIS REPORT
======================================================================

The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-98839 is available here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-98839

The original announcement does not normally provide a security severity
estimate, CVSS assessment, or enough information to determine whether the
reported kernel bug represents a practically relevant security issue.

This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel
vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin. It combines
an autonomous classifier with LLM-assisted technical analysis and a
separate ActionableScore mechanism.

The purpose of this report is to prioritize Linux kernel CVEs before
manual review, identify cases that require prompt investigation, and
support automatic closure of issues that are unlikely to have meaningful
security impact.

Published priority for this report: MODERATE REGULAR
Manual review required: NO

A detailed explanation of the methodology and priority rules is included
at the end of this message.

======================================================================
AL-KERNEL CLASSIFICATION RESULT
======================================================================

CVE-2026-98839	MODERATE	https://www.kernelcve.org/list/?q=CVE-2026-98839 CHECK WITH IMPACT FROM ORIG NN MODERATE | AEGIS IMPACT MODERATE_KPANIC AEGIS_AS=1 LEGACY=MODERATE RESULT=DIFF (final Legacy and Aegis differ; FINAL: MODERATE, Aegis: MODERATE_KPANIC)	Maybe valid. Check manually. Hints by AL-KERNEL: The best (paranoid) CVSS is 'AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H';CWE-191;CWE-125;CWE-362;*CWE-200;Other CVSS 'AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L';BEST CVSS score: '6.3';DESCR 'A race in paste_selection can occur when the line discipline buffer is full and vc_sel.lock is released while the caller sleeps on tty write_wait. A concurrent TIOCLINUX TIOCL_SETSEL operation can replace vc_sel.buffer with a shorter allocation and reduce vc_sel.buf_len below the saved pasted offset. The following unsigned subtraction can underflow and make tty_ldisc_receive_buf read up to 4094 bytes beyond the new slab object into the TTY input path. This provides a concrete out of bounds read with possible disclosure of adjacent kernel heap data and possible availability impact, but the code does not provide an out of bounds write or UAF primitive. For the CVSS the PR:L value is used because reliable triggering requires a local process with access to the affected virtual console and TIOCLINUX operations. AC:H reflects the race window and the need to fill the line discipline buffer so paste_selection drops the lock and waits. The issue is not directly network reachable. Automated impact decision path. The original SimpleNet classifier selected MODERATE. The primary LLM estimated paranoid CVSS 6.3 and the production ActionableScore returned 2 with recommendation Ordinary Moderate. The production rules then evaluated CVSS thresholds and ActionableScore thresholds. No severity changing production threshold or specialist override was recorded. The legacy KP specialist has no review artifact for this run. The legacy FD or DH downgrade specialist has no review artifact for this run. Exact triggered rule markers were V41_INHERITED_KPANIC_PROMOTION_BLOCKED and MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED. The independent weaker Aegis shadow evaluated CVSS 2.5 and ActionableScore 1 with primitive class CLASS_C and manual review REQUIRED. Its independently reconciled impact was MODERATE_KPANIC. The models disagreed but the aggregation rules retained the production result. The final reported impact is MODERATE.';YES REQUIRES MANUAL CHECK; ,and ActionableScore result is Ordinary Moderate (with actual score 2)	MAYBE	READ KASAN OOB PRINTF-TTY LINUS  V41_INHERITED_KPANIC_PROMOTION_BLOCKED MANUAL_REVIEW_REQUIRED	-	-	checked

======================================================================
ACTIONABLESCORE ANALYSIS
======================================================================

ActionableScore=2
ActionableScoreLower=1
PrimitiveClass=CLASS_C
RealUAF=NO
HostAdminRequired=NO
NamespaceScopedPrivilege=UNKNOWN
ImportantCandidate=NO
ManualReview=RECOMMENDED
AutoDowngradeAllowed=YES
RequiresHostUID0=NO
AuthorizationDecisionBypass=NO
ProtectedResourceImpact=NONE
B4PendingReview=NO
B4PendingConfirmed=NO

1. ActionableScore

* Raw base score: 1.
* Conservative score: 1; no floor or cap applied.
* Raw paranoid score: 2.
* Paranoid score: 2; no floor or cap applied.
* Final recommended bucket: **Ordinary Moderate**::

2. Signal breakdown

* +1 weak read-only OOB primitive: `vc_sel.buf_len - pasted` underflows after the selection is replaced by a shorter buffer, causing a confirmed slab OOB read.
* +1 local below-host-admin trigger: supplied evidence supports a local process with access to the affected virtual console and TIOCLINUX operations.
* -1 hard race: triggering requires filling the line-discipline buffer, dropping the mutex while sleeping, and concurrently replacing the selection.
* Paranoid +1 confidentiality: up to 4094 adjacent slab bytes are copied into the TTY line-discipline input path, providing a technically plausible read-back route. The visible evidence does not prove which process can retrieve those bytes, so this is withheld from the conservative score.
* No write, UAF, controlled reclaim, authorization bypass, or remote reachability is shown.
* No crash point: KASAN detects the read, but a reliable production-kernel crash is not established.
* NEW52/B5-R does not apply: this is an OOB read caused by unsigned underflow, not a retry-accumulated heap OOB write.

3. Reachability analysis

The trigger is local and requires access to the relevant virtual console plus concurrent paste and `TIOCL_SETSEL` activity. The supplied low-privilege assessment supports below-host-admin and non-UID-0 reachability, but does not establish any user-namespace-scoped capability chain. The race is materially timing-dependent and requires line-discipline backpressure; no special hardware, boot option, or network path is involved.

4. Primitive and severity reading

The exact primitive is a bounded slab OOB read from `vc_sel.buffer + pasted`, subsequently copied into TTY input processing. It is neither an OOB write nor a lifetime violation. Possible heap-data disclosure is credible but not conclusively demonstrated to a readable attacker endpoint. This is therefore CLASS_C, not an Important-keeping corruption primitive. Auto-downgrade remains allowed, with manual confirmation of read-back and actual console permissions recommended.

5. One-sentence report phrase

A local race can underflow the VT selection length and copy up to 4094 bytes past a replacement selection buffer into the TTY input path.

6. Manual review advice

MANUAL CHECK RECOMMENDED

Confirm attacker-readable TTY output and the exact permissions required for the complete concurrent trigger.

7. Call-site confidence

Call-site confidence: high

======================================================================
UPSTREAM PATCH SUMMARY
======================================================================

Patch: vt: selection: Fix unsigned underflow and slab-out-of-bounds read in paste_selection()
Commit: 037d7e3ca5c593092f4b0d471eb869a85cbddde0
Upstream URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=037d7e3ca5c593092f4b0d471eb869a85cbddde0

Commit description:

In paste_selection(), the loop copies min_t(unsigned int,
vc_sel.buf_len - pasted,tty->receive_room) bytes per iteration into
tty_ldisc_receive_buf() and increments pasted += count.

Because the selection mutex (vc_sel.lock) is dropped inside the loop
Whenever the line discipline buffer fills up and paste_selection()
sleeps on tty->write_wait, a concurrent TIOCLINUX (TIOCL_SETSEL) ioctl
can replace vc_sel.buffer with a shorter selection and reduce
vc_sel.buf_len below pasted.

When paste_selection() resumes, vc_sel.buf_len - pasted underflows as an
unsigned integer to a large positive value, causing
tty_ldisc_receive_buf(ld, vc_sel.buffer + pasted, NULL, count) to read
up to 4094 bytes out-of-bounds past the newly allocated vc_sel.buffer.

Fix this by terminating the loop when pasted >= vc_sel.buf_len.

Kernel stack trace (Linux 7.3.0-rc3):
 ==================================================================
 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in n_tty_receive_buf_common+0xa01/0x1650
 Read of size 4094 at addr ffff888101c58010 by task kworker/u17:1/65
 Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0xa0
  print_report+0x153/0x4c6
  kasan_report+0xf1/0x120
  kasan_check_range+0x11c/0x200
  __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70
  n_tty_receive_buf_common+0xa01/0x1650
  tty_ldisc_receive_buf+0x66/0x110
  tty_port_default_receive_buf+0x6b/0xb0
  flush_to_ldisc+0x1b4/0x410
  process_one_work+0x6ff/0x1110
  worker_thread+0x4a8/0xb70
  kthread+0x307/0x3e0
  ret_from_fork+0x3ed/0x680
  </TASK>
 ==================================================================

Fixes: e8c75a3 ("vt: selection, push sel_lock up")
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Changed files:
  drivers/tty/vt/selection.c

Diff excerpt:

Not included in this email. See the upstream URL for the full patch.

Full patch:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=037d7e3ca5c593092f4b0d471eb869a85cbddde0

======================================================================
DETAILED REPORT METHODOLOGY
======================================================================

The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-98839 can be found here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-98839

The original CVE announcement normally does not include a security-level
estimate. In particular, it may not contain a CVSS assessment, an impact
level, or enough information to determine whether the reported bug is a
practically relevant security issue. One purpose of this parallel CVE list
is to provide that missing technical and prioritization information.

The original goal of the AL-KERNEL project was to prioritize Linux kernel
CVE analysis automatically before manual review. The system can also help
identify non-security issues that may be suitable for automatic closure.

This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel
vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin.

The first analysis stage combines an autonomous classifier with additional
LLM-based analysis. The autonomous classifier runs locally on a CPU and is
based on a backpropagation neural network. Together, these mechanisms
produce a technical vulnerability description, identify likely weakness
types, estimate CVSS severity, and provide input for ActionableScore.

Two CVSS estimates are retained because incomplete kernel vulnerability
information often permits more than one defensible interpretation:

  Conservative CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L
  The Best / paranoid CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
  The Best / paranoid CVSS score: 6.3

The conservative vector represents a lower-impact interpretation.
The Best/paranoid vector intentionally represents a plausible upper-bound
interpretation and should not automatically be treated as demonstrated
real-world impact.

CVSS may also need to be adjusted for a particular Linux deployment,
because actual reachability, privileges, enabled kernel configuration,
hardware, namespaces, exposed device nodes, and other environmental
conditions can differ significantly between systems.

A separate ActionableScore mechanism evaluates practical remediation
urgency. Its analysis may include reachability, attack prerequisites,
subsystem exposure, memory-corruption characteristics, denial-of-service
reliability, and possible confidentiality, integrity, or
privilege-escalation impact.

  Conservative ActionableScore: 1
  Paranoid ActionableScore: 2

The final base severity is taken directly from the second tab-separated
field of the AL-KERNEL classification result. ActionableScore does not
replace or independently override that final AL-KERNEL decision, and
if ActionableScore adjusted impact level of ALKERNEL, then you would see
self-readable flags above like INCREASED_TO_HIGH_BASED_ON_ACTIONABLESCOREHIGHEREQTHAN7.

For an AL-KERNEL result of MODERATE, this report uses the following
additional presentation split:

  ActionableScore below 5   -> MODERATE REGULAR
  ActionableScore 5 or more -> MODERATE 7.0

The distinction between MODERATE REGULAR and MODERATE 7.0 makes it
possible to identify Moderate issues that should receive manual analysis
and fixes before lower-priority MODERATE REGULAR issues. In many cases,
MODERATE REGULAR fixes may wait for a later rebase or routine update.

There is one override in which MODERATE REGULAR becomes MODERATE 7.0
even when the ActionableScore is below 5. When the AL-KERNEL result
contains the KPANIC flag, a MODERATE result is always presented as
MODERATE 7.0. The KPANIC flag selected with few regexps without
usage of AI at all, so it helps to detect cases when Kernel Crash happens
and similar (to filter False-Negative results from the LLM usage).

KPANIC indicates that a reliable kernel crash, kernel panic, or similarly
serious kernel availability impact was identified by the classification
workflow.

AL-KERNEL base severity for this report: MODERATE
KPANIC detected for this report: NO
Published priority for this report (same as in Subject): MODERATE REGULAR

These results are intended to support engineering triage. They are
machine-generated estimates, and cases marked for manual review should
be validated by a human security engineer before final disposition.
For more info read docs linked from here: https://kernelcve.org/
(and you can submit you own patch there to generate such a report
for non-existant CVE-id yet).

Note that in many cases this AI tool selects higher severity, than
real is (means you can expect Importants instead of Moderate 7.0 or
Moderates 7.0 instead of regular Moderates). If you see such cases,
please use reply email interface to add additional manual analyses
info to this particular CVE.
And please, please, let me know when you see Lows instead of Importants
or Important instead of Low (because particular for such cases I
need to tune this AI tool to make it better for this one and next similar).
My contact email for such notifications is [email protected] (and both
send reply to CVE record itself too and see "reply" button below for howto reply).

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-10-24 15:36 UTC|newest]

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