[CVE-2026-80593][LOW] hwmon: (asus_atk0110) Check package count before accessing element

[CVE-2026-80593][LOW] hwmon: (asus_atk0110) Check package count before accessing element

[AL-KERNEL]

CVE: CVE-2026-80593
Priority: LOW
AL-KERNEL base severity: LOW
KPANIC flag: NO
Patch: hwmon: (asus_atk0110) Check package count before accessing element
Commit: 2a137124664aad1e36d8d74e8e2207365a04737f
Upstream patch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=2a137124664aad1e36d8d74e8e2207365a04737f
Original CVE announcement: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-80593
Analysis date: Fri, 28 Aug 2026 05:57:00 -0400
ActionableScore: 1
ActionableScore lower bound: 0
Actionable bucket: Ordinary Moderate / Low-like
Manual review required: YES

Summary:
A malformed ACPI GGRP firmware package can cause asus_atk0110 to read past a zero length package element array during EC detection, but triggering generally requires firmware or ACPI override control and the realistic impact is limited to driver failure or local denial of service.

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ABOUT THIS REPORT
======================================================================

The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-80593 is available here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-80593

The original announcement does not normally provide a security severity
estimate, CVSS assessment, or enough information to determine whether the
reported kernel bug represents a practically relevant security issue.

This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel
vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin. It combines
an autonomous classifier with LLM-assisted technical analysis and a
separate ActionableScore mechanism.

The purpose of this report is to prioritize Linux kernel CVEs before
manual review, identify cases that require prompt investigation, and
support automatic closure of issues that are unlikely to have meaningful
security impact.

Published priority for this report: LOW
Manual review required: YES

A detailed explanation of the methodology and priority rules is included
at the end of this message.

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AL-KERNEL CLASSIFICATION RESULT
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CVE-2026-80593	LOW	CHECK WITH IMPACT FROM ORIG NN MODERATE	Maybe valid. Check manually. Hints by AL-KERNEL: The best (paranoid) CVSS is 'AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H';CWE-125;*CWE-20;CWE-754;Other CVSS 'AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L';BEST CVSS score: '4.7';DESCR 'asus_atk0110 can read past the ACPI package element array in atk_ec_present() because it accesses package elements index 0 without checking that package count is non zero. A malformed firmware GGRP package with an empty sub package can trigger an out of bounds read during EC detection and may crash the kernel or break driver probing. For the CVSS the PR:H is used because reliable triggering normally requires administrator level control over firmware tables, ACPI override, or boot configuration rather than an unprivileged local interface. The issue is not network reachable. Impact is mainly denial of service. A paranoid interpretation may include limited confidentiality impact from an invalid kernel read, but there is no supported path to memory write or privilege escalation.';NO MANUAL CHECK; ,and ActionableScore result is Ordinary Moderate / Low-like (with actual score 1)	YES	OOB SIMPLEFIX IMPROVEONLY DEBUGFS  DECREASED_TO_MODERATE_REGULAR_FROM_MODERATE7_BASED_ON_GUESSCVSS_AND_CIANNH DECREASED_TO_LOW_FROM_MODERATE_BASED_ON_ACTIONABLESCORELESSTHAN3	NO	NO	checked

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ACTIONABLESCORE ANALYSIS
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ActionableScore=1
ActionableScoreLower=0

## 1. ActionableScore

* Conservative score: 0
* Paranoid score: 1
* Final recommended bucket: **Ordinary Moderate / Low-like**::

## 2. Signal breakdown

Conservative scoring:

* Firmware-mediated external influence: +1. The malformed data comes from ACPI firmware via the GGRP method.
* Requires admin/root/firmware control in typical deployments: -2. Reliable triggering normally requires malicious firmware, ACPI table override, or boot/runtime configuration control.
* Rare AND difficult-to-reach subsystem/configuration: -1. This is specific to asus_atk0110 hardware/firmware behavior and malformed ACPI package contents.
* Conservative total floors to 0.

Paranoid scoring:

* Firmware-mediated external influence: +1. Firmware can supply a zero-count sub-package.
* Memory corruption, weak/indirect corruption candidate: +1. The primitive is an out-of-bounds read from `obj->package.elements[0]`, but it is read-only and no write, UAF, reclaim, callback, or type confusion primitive is shown.
* Availability impact realistic: +1. A malformed firmware package may cause a fault, warning, driver probe failure, or local DoS.
* Requires admin/root/firmware control in typical deployments: -2.
* Paranoid total: 1.

Not counted:

* No remote/network reachability.
* No local unprivileged trigger.
* No strong LPE plausibility.
* No arbitrary write, OOB write, UAF, double-free, refcount takeover, or page-cache corruption.
* No practical confidentiality disclosure path, because the invalid read is only used for an internal type check and is not returned to userspace.

## 3. Reachability analysis

The bug is reachable when the `asus_atk0110` hwmon driver parses the ACPI GGRP management package and encounters an empty sub-package. In normal deployments, ACPI firmware tables are provided by platform firmware and are not controlled by an unprivileged local user.

Practical attacker control usually requires administrator-level ability to override ACPI tables, control boot configuration, install modified firmware, or otherwise influence platform firmware data. Containers and namespaces do not materially reduce this requirement because they do not normally provide ACPI firmware control. The path is not network-triggerable.

Call-site confidence: high for the local OOB read condition shown by the patch. Medium for practical impact, because the patch shows the invalid read but does not show a concrete crash trace or disclosure path.

## 4. Severity interpretation

This behaves like a Low-like or ordinary Moderate issue rather than an Actionable Moderate or Important kernel vulnerability. The theoretical primitive is an out-of-bounds read, but it is firmware-fed, read-only, and highly constrained. Realistic impact is limited to driver probing failure or possible local DoS on affected hardware with malformed firmware.

There is no evidence supporting privilege escalation, attacker-controlled memory corruption, or sensitive data disclosure. The paranoid score only preserves a small amount of concern for invalid kernel memory access in a trusted driver path.

## 5. One-sentence report phrase

A malformed ACPI GGRP firmware package can cause asus_atk0110 to read past a zero length package element array during EC detection, but triggering generally requires firmware or ACPI override control and the realistic impact is limited to driver failure or local denial of service.

## 6. Manual review recommendation

NO MANUAL CHECK NEEDED. NO MANUAL CHECK REQUIRED COULD BE AUTOCLOSED.

Reason: low ActionableScore, firmware-controlled input, no network reachability, no unprivileged local trigger, and no demonstrated write, UAF, privilege escalation, or disclosure primitive.

======================================================================
UPSTREAM PATCH SUMMARY
======================================================================

Patch: hwmon: (asus_atk0110) Check package count before accessing element
Commit: 2a137124664aad1e36d8d74e8e2207365a04737f
Upstream URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=2a137124664aad1e36d8d74e8e2207365a04737f

Commit description:

atk_ec_present() walks the management group package returned by the GGRP
ACPI method and, for each sub-package, reads its first element:

	id = &obj->package.elements[0];
	if (id->type != ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER)

without checking that the sub-package is non-empty.  ACPICA allocates the
element array with exactly package.count entries, so for a sub-package
with a zero count this reads past the allocation.

The sibling function atk_debugfs_ggrp_open() performs the same access but
skips empty packages with a package.count check first.  Add the same
check to atk_ec_present() so a malformed firmware package cannot trigger
an out-of-bounds read.

Fixes: 9e6eba6 ("hwmon: (asus_atk0110) Enable the EC")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260619122746.721981-1-sammiee5311@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Changed files:
  drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c

Diff excerpt:

Not included in this email. See the upstream URL for the full patch.

Full patch:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=2a137124664aad1e36d8d74e8e2207365a04737f

======================================================================
DETAILED REPORT METHODOLOGY
======================================================================

The original Linux kernel CVE announcement for CVE-2026-80593 can be found here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/?q=CVE-2026-80593

The original CVE announcement normally does not include a security-level
estimate. In particular, it may not contain a CVSS assessment, an impact
level, or enough information to determine whether the reported bug is a
practically relevant security issue. One purpose of this parallel CVE list
is to provide that missing technical and prioritization information.

The original goal of the AL-KERNEL project was to prioritize Linux kernel
CVE analysis automatically before manual review. The system can also help
identify non-security issues that may be suitable for automatic closure.

This report was generated by AL-KERNEL, an AI-assisted Linux kernel
vulnerability analysis system developed by Alexander Larkin.

The first analysis stage combines an autonomous classifier with additional
LLM-based analysis. The autonomous classifier runs locally on a CPU and is
based on a backpropagation neural network. Together, these mechanisms
produce a technical vulnerability description, identify likely weakness
types, estimate CVSS severity, and provide input for ActionableScore.

Two CVSS estimates are retained because incomplete kernel vulnerability
information often permits more than one defensible interpretation:

  Conservative CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
  The Best / paranoid CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H
  The Best / paranoid CVSS score: 4.7

The conservative vector represents a lower-impact interpretation.
The Best/paranoid vector intentionally represents a plausible upper-bound
interpretation and should not automatically be treated as demonstrated
real-world impact.

CVSS may also need to be adjusted for a particular Linux deployment,
because actual reachability, privileges, enabled kernel configuration,
hardware, namespaces, exposed device nodes, and other environmental
conditions can differ significantly between systems.

A separate ActionableScore mechanism evaluates practical remediation
urgency. Its analysis may include reachability, attack prerequisites,
subsystem exposure, memory-corruption characteristics, denial-of-service
reliability, and possible confidentiality, integrity, or
privilege-escalation impact.

  Conservative ActionableScore: 0
  Paranoid ActionableScore: 1

The final base severity is taken directly from the second tab-separated
field of the AL-KERNEL classification result. ActionableScore does not
replace or independently override that final AL-KERNEL decision, and
if ActionableScore adjusted impact level of ALKERNEL, then you would see
self-readable flags above like INCREASED_TO_HIGH_BASED_ON_ACTIONABLESCOREHIGHEREQTHAN7.

For an AL-KERNEL result of MODERATE, this report uses the following
additional presentation split:

  ActionableScore below 5   -> MODERATE REGULAR
  ActionableScore 5 or more -> MODERATE 7.0

The distinction between MODERATE REGULAR and MODERATE 7.0 makes it
possible to identify Moderate issues that should receive manual analysis
and fixes before lower-priority MODERATE REGULAR issues. In many cases,
MODERATE REGULAR fixes may wait for a later rebase or routine update.

There is one override in which MODERATE REGULAR becomes MODERATE 7.0
even when the ActionableScore is below 5. When the AL-KERNEL result
contains the KPANIC flag, a MODERATE result is always presented as
MODERATE 7.0. The KPANIC flag selected with few regexps without
usage of AI at all, so it helps to detect cases when Kernel Crash happens
and similar (to filter False-Negative results from the LLM usage).

KPANIC indicates that a reliable kernel crash, kernel panic, or similarly
serious kernel availability impact was identified by the classification
workflow.

AL-KERNEL base severity for this report: LOW
KPANIC detected for this report: NO
Published priority for this report (same as in Subject): LOW

These results are intended to support engineering triage. They are
machine-generated estimates, and cases marked for manual review should
be validated by a human security engineer before final disposition.
For more info read docs linked from here: https://kernelcve.org/
(and you can submit you own patch there to generate such a report
for non-existant CVE-id yet).

Note that in many cases this AI tool selects higher severity, than
real is (means you can expect Importants instead of Moderate 7.0 or
Moderates 7.0 instead of regular Moderates). If you see such cases,
please use reply email interface to add additional manual analyses
info to this particular CVE.
And please, please, let me know when you see Lows instead of Importants
or Important instead of Low (because particular for such cases I
need to tune this AI tool to make it better for this one and next similar).
My contact email for such notifications is alexanjelausa@gmail.com (and both
send reply to CVE record itself too and see "reply" button below for howto reply).